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Abstract 
This paper identifies several social choice correspondences which are and are 
not fully implementable in economic environments >.hen agents are incompletely 
informed about the environment. We show that in contrast to results in the
case of complete information, neither efficient allocations nor core 
allocations define implementable social choice correspondences. We also 
identify conditions under which the Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
correspondence is implementable. We extend the concepts of fair allocations 
and Lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information, and show 
that envy-free allocations and Lindahl allocations are implementable under 
some conditions while fair allocations are not, 
I. Introduction 
The problem of full implementation can be stated as follows. Given a set 
of "desirable" allocations, under mat circumstances can we construct a 
non-cooperative game whose equilibrium outcomes coincide with those 
allocations ? The primary reason for posing such a question is that in most 
economic settings, the desirability of an allocation is a function of the 
parameters of the economic environment. Since these parameters involve 
personal characteristics (e.g. preferences) of the individuals in the economy, 
the game must be constructed so that as these personal characteristics change, 
the equilibrium behavior of the individual� also changes in the desired way. 
Until recently, the only posit�ve results obtained on full implementation 
assumed that all individuals had complete information, i.e. that the personal 
characteristics of all individuals were publicly known. A characterization of 
allocations implementable via Nash equilibria was given by Maskin [1977), who 
showed that a condition called monotonocity was necessary and essentially 
sufficient for implementation. A drawback of the assumption of complete 
information, besides its being unrealistic, is that it is hard to justify the 
use of a decentralized mechanism to get individuals to reveal "private" 
characteristics which are already known (see Postlewaite [1986) for a further 
critique along these lines). 
Recent work on full implementation has focussed on economies with 
incomplete information. Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986) showed that an 
incomplete information version of Maskin's condition was necessary for 
implementation via Bayesian equilibrium. In a recent paper (Palfrey and 
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Srivastava (1985] ), we prove that an extended verslon of that cond!t!on. 
called Bayesian Honotonicity, is necessary for implementation, and together 
with a self-selection condition, is sufficient for implementation. In this 
paper, we identify several important economic allocations which are and are 
not implementable. 
There are many similarities between the formal structure of the complete 
information Nash equilibrium approach (Hurwicz [1979a, 1979b), Schmeidler 
[1980), Postlewaite [1986), Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaiate [1984)) and the 
incomplete information approach. Both approaches define a class of 
environments and associate to each environment a set of feasible allocations. 
With incomplete information, individuals are also endowed with a partition of 
the class of environments and a prior over the environments. When a state of 
the economy is·realized, each individual observes an event from his partition 
and revises his priors according to Bayes' rule. This information structure 
is common knowledge, and, for the purposes of this paper, is assumed to be 
known by the planner. The complete information model is a special case of the 
above formulation: the partition is the complete information partition of the 
environments and consequently priors do not 
information structure is also implicitly
. 
individuals and known to the planner as well. 
play a role; this degenerate 
common knowledge among the 
A social choice function for an incomplete information economy is defined
as a mapping which associates with each environment ("state") in the class of 
environments a feasible allocation. One may think of a social choice 
function, then, as defining a state-contingent allocation. A Social Choice 
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Correspondence for an incomplete information economy is a collection of these 
state-contingent allocations (Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986)). In 
contrast, a social choice correspondence in the complete information setup is 
usually defined as a mapping which assigns 'to each environment a· set of 
(desirable) feasible allocations. The reason for the difference is that with 
incomplete information, the relevant notion of an allocation is a 
state-contingent allocation. To avoid confusion, we will refer to the 
incomplete information correspondence as a social choice set, since it is 
simply a set of feasible state contingent allocations. 
To study >hether social choice sets can be attained as equilibrium 
outcomes of non-cooperative games, we use the notion of (full) Bayesian 
implementation. Bayesian implementation is a property defined on social 
choice sets just as Nash implementation is a �roperty defined on social choice 
correspondences. Nash implementation is a special . case of Bayesian 
implementation when all individuals in the economy have complete information. 
In that case, the set of all (measurable) selections from a given social 
choice correspondence in a complete information economy defines a social 
choice set for that economy. 
Some of the most important results from the complete information approach 
involve identifying particula; correspondences >hich are Nash implementable. 
They include, under appropriate regularity conditions: 
(1) the Pareto correspondence 
(2) the Core correspondence 
(3) the Walrasian correspondence 
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(4) the 'Fair correspondence 
(5) the Lindahl correspondence. 
The purpose of this paper is to perform an analogous identification for 
incomplete information economies. fuwever, in order to do so, we need to 
define a point-set mapping on a domain of incomplete information economies 
which associates a social choice set to each economy in the domain. This maps 
each economy into a set of state-contingent allocations in much the same way 
as a social choice correspondence associates each complete information 
environment to a set of (noncontingent) allocations. We then ask what 
mappings of this type are implementable everywhere in the domain. 
We find that the set of Rational Expectations Equilbria are implementable 
in domains of incomplete information economies in which individuals are risk 
averse, information is non-exclusive, individual endowinents are state 
independent, and the equilibria are interior to consumption sets. Core 
allocations and efficient allocations, defined in several ways following 
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983] , are not implementable. Envy-free allocations 
and Lindahl allocations (appropriately modified to account for incomplete 
information) are implementable. 
are not implementable. 
Fair allocations (envy-free and efficient) 
Finally, we 'lolOUld like to stress the fundamental difference between the 
approach this paper takes and related research which has investigated 
achievability (or truthful implementation) rather than full implementation. 
Achievability does not require that the set of equilibrium outcomes of a 
mechanism coincide with the social choice set or even that they are contained 
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in the social. choice set. Rather, an allocation is achievable if it is an 
equilibrium outcome to some game. '!he work of Myerson [1979] and Harris and 
Townsend [1981] and llDSt subsequent work (in· auction theory, for example) has 
relied heavily on the revelation principle either to identify the set of 
achievable allocations in a particular setting or to characterize 
"truth-telling" mechanisms to achieve allocations with particular properties. 
Importantly, as pointed rut first by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin [1979] for 
complete information settings and later by Postlewaite and Schmeidler [ 1986] 
with incomplete information, the revelation principle applies only to 
achievability, not to (full) impiementation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Definitions and the basic model are 
laid out. in Section II. 
efficient allocations. 
Section III establishes the non-implementability of 
The implementability of Rational Expectations. 
Equilibria is analyzed in Section IV. Sections V and VI address envy-free and 
fair allocations, and public goods economies, respectively. 
II. The Model and Definitions 
This Section contains our basic model and definitions of feasibility and 
implementation as they apply to our specific setting. These are adapted from 
Palfrey and Srivastava [ 1985]. In that paper, full implementation of a set of 
environment contingent (state-contingent) allocations was defined relative to 
a given differential information economy. In this paper, � define an 
extended notion of implementation, which we call global implementation. This 
concept is convenient for assessing the implementability of social choice sets 
across a large domain of differential information economies, in the spirit of 
earlier work on Nash implementation. 
A. Definitions 
First we defin·e a differential ·information economy (henceforth referred to 
as any economy) and a domain of economies. An economy is a finite set of 
economic environments (states), S, S-(1,2, .. . ,S}, a set of individuals, I, 
indexed by i, and an aggregate endowment, w e RL, w � O. In environment s, 
agent i has utility function ui( .,s) and endowment .J (s). We assume that ui 
is strictly increasing and bounded below. Consumption sets are the nonnegative 
orthant, and we normalize uf (O,s) - 0 for all i and s. 
Let A be the set of all feasible allocations, 
A 
x 
{z E RLI .I: z' I I . + 1-1 
( x: S -+ A J 
:S '(O)' ] , and let
be the set of feasible environment-contingent allocations. 
Set is a subset F c X. 
A Social Choice 
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The information available to agent i E I is given by a partition IIi of S; 
we denote by Ei (s) the event in II i which contains s. Each agent also has a 
prior distribution over environments, denoted by qi , and we assume that 
qi (s) > 0 for all i,s. An economy d is a collection < S,I,w,U,II,q). A 
domain, D, is a collection of economies. 
We assume that the partitions ( II;) , the priors, ( qi) , and the set of state 
dependent utility functions, ( Ui ( · , s)) , are all· common knowledge. 
Ei (s) E IIi, the expected utility of xi is 
Vi (x,s) • E. qi (t l Ei (s))Uf (xi(t),t). 
tEE1 (s) 
where 
{ 0 
qi (t) 
q1 (E1 (s)) 
if t '1. Ei (s) 
if t E Ei (s) 
Given 
If i has complete information, i. e. Ei(s>
'
- ( s) for all s, then., at any state 
s, the expected utility of xi to i reduces to ui (xi (s),s). 
A mechanism for an economy is a pair (M,g), where M - Mlx M2x .... x Ml, 
g: M -+ A. We denote by ft the i'th component vector of g. A strategy for 
agent i is ai: nf -+Mi. Given an environment s, let 
E(s) - (El (s), . . . .  ,El (s)), a(E(s)) - (al (El (s)), . . . .  ,a' (E' (s))), 
a - (al, . . ,,al), and a-i - (a1 , . .  ,ai-1,ai+1, . . ,a1). Given a strategy a, let. 
g(a) - (g(a(E(l)), . . .  ,g(a(E( S)))). 
Qefinition 1: ai is a best response to u-i if for all s E S, 
vi (g(u -i ,al ) ,s) � vi (g(u-f ,uf) ,s) for all uf: nf -+Mi. 
Definition 2 : a is an equilibrium to (M,g) if a i  is a best response to u-i 
for all i. 
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B. Implementation 
Fix an ec9nomy d - < S,I,w,U,IT,q>. We can now define (full) implementation 
of a social choice set in the economy. 
Definition 3 : A mechanism (M,g) implements F if 
(i) For any x E F, there exists an equilibrium a to (M,g) such that g(a) - x. 
(ii) If a is an equilibrium to (M,g) then g(a) E F. 
Ir there exists a mechanism (M,g) which implements F, then F is said to be 
implementable. We turn next to the Bayesian monotonicity condition which is 
necessary for implementation. Notatior:i is considerably simplified if we make 
the following assumption of no redundant states: 
Assumption: (No Redundant States) For all s, � Ei (s) - ( s) 
Qefinition 4 : A collection of functions a - (al , ... ,c) ) , with ai :nl 
is compatible with IT if for all (E1, . . .  ,E') such that Ei E ni for all i, 
Although this definition appears to be quite formidable, it captures a very 
simple idea. Each ai can be thought of as a reporting strategy for agent i, 
the interpretation being that when i has observed Ei (s), he acts as if he 
observed ai (Ei (s)). Consider a direct mechanism, i. e. Mi - ni for all i. In
this case, the set of all possible � coincides with the set of all 
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strategies available to agent i. Suppose now that when s occurs, each i 
reports ai (Ei (s)) instead of Ei (s). Then, there are two possibilities: either 
In the former case, the reports of the 
agents are called incompatible while in the latter case, they are called 
compatible. If the reports are incompatible, the planner can infer that some 
agent must be lying about his event, while if the reports are compatible, the 
planner cannot tell whether anyone is lying. It is possible for the planner 
to provide effective incentives to prevent any equilibrium which involves 
incompatible reports. This allows us to restrict attention to compatible 
reporting strategies, where compatibility is formalized in the above 
definition. 
Since we assume that for all s, � Ei (s) - [s}, we have� ai (El),.¢ if and 
only if it is a singleton. Accordingly, for any a compatible with II, we 
define 
a(s) - � ai (El (s)), Xa(t) - x(a(t)), 
Definition 5 : F satisfies Bayesian Monotonicity (BM) if for all a compatible 
with II, If 
(i) X E F 
(ii) For all i, for all s, for all y : S 4 A, 
A detailed interpretation of this condition is given in Palfrey and 
Srivastava [1985]. Here, we remark that in (ii) of the condition, the first 
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inequality is satisfied only if x is an equilibrium outcome to some 11Echanism 
and the second is satisfied only if x,,, is an equilibrium outcome to the same 
mechanism. The condition then states that if menever x is an equilibrium 
outcome so is Xa, then Xa must lie in the social choice set. 
BM is a necessary for implementation, as are certain self-selection 
conditions. For the purposes of this paper, we will assume a condition which 
guarantees that self-selection will hold for all social choice sets in an 
economy. It is called Non-Exclusivity of Information (NEI), and is due to 
Postlewaite and Schmeidler [1986]. 
Assumption (NE!): El (s) � 
j
�
i 
Ej (s) for all s,i. 
Notice that NE! together with the assumption of no redundant stat�s implies: 
.�. Ej (s) - [s} J � l 
for all i,s. 
We will repeatedly apply the following theorem which is a special case of a 
more general theorem proved in Palfrey and Srivastava [1985]: 
Theorem 1 (a) If F is implementable, then F satisfies BM. 
(b) If I �  3, F satisfies BM, NE! holds, and F,. 0, then F is
implementable, 
By F,. 0 we mean that x E F �xi (s) ,. 0 for all i,s. 
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C. Global implementation relative to a domain of economies 
Let D be a domain. Define a Social Choice Correspondence (SCC) on D, F, 
as a set-valued function which assigns to every economy d E D a social choice 
set F (d) c X. 
Definition 6: An SCC F is Globally Implementable Relative to Domain D if, for 
all d E D, F(d) is implementable. 
The following two domains will be referred to frequently in the rest of the 
paper: 
1. The NE! domain with risk averse preferences: 
D1 - { d I S is finite ; NE! is satisfied 
wi (s) - wi � 0 for all i,s 
ui ( · ,s) concave for all i)
2. The complete information neoclassical domain: 
D2 - { E3 , E4 , . . . , E1 , • • • ) 
where E1 includes all environments with I individuals each of 
whom has a continuous quasi-concave increasing utility function 
in each state and all agents have complete information. 
The first domain is _an important subset of the set of all economies. In 
all economies in this domain, as pointed out in Palfrey and Srivastava [1986], 
any singleton state-contingent allocation ean be achieved ·(truthfully 
implemented) by a " forcing" type of mechanism, but only social choice sets 
satisfying Bayesian Monotonicity are fully implementable. 
The second domain is even more restrictive informationally but is of
special interest because of its extensive use in the literatu.re on 
ll 
implementation via Nash equi 1 ibriwn in complete inf or mat [on econom It• s [t [ s 
well known for example that the sec IJ-iich assigns to each economy [ts set 0 f 
(ex post) Pareto optimal state contingent allocations is globally 
implementable relative to Dz . Another important SCC which is known to be 
globally implementable relative to D2 is the constrained Walrasian equilibriwn 
correspondence. (This is equivalent to the Walrasian correspondence except in 
some cases where the equilibriwn occurs on the boundary of the feasible set; 
see Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite {1984]). Also, Thomson [1979] has shown 
that fair allocations are Nash implementable. Lindahl equilibrium allocations 
have been shown to be Nash implementable in public goods economies with linear 
production technologies. In contrast, we' are interested in identifying what 
interesting SCC' s are globally 'implementable relative to domains in which 
individuals do ,not have complete 'information. These include domains such as 
D1 . 
The rest of the paper addresses the following questions. First, is there 
a natural analogue to Pareto optimality which defines a globally implementable 
SCC in a large domain of differential information economies? Second, is there 
a natural analogue to the Walrasian correspondence which defines a globally 
implementable SCF relative to a large domain? Third, can we adapt the 
definition of fair allocations to economies with incomplete information in a 
way such that they are globally implementable? Fourth, what is the 
appropriate (in this sense) extension of the complete information Lindahl 
equilibrium? 
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III. Efficient Allocations 
In this Section, we examine whether efficient allocations are globally 
implementable relative to D1 . Following Holmstrom and Myerson [1983], we
distinguish between three notions of optimality, namely ex-ante, interim, and 
ex-post optimality. We will show that the sec mapping economies into the set 
of optimal state-contingent allocations, variously defined, is not globally 
implementable. This result is surprising, and shows that the the intuition 
behind the implementability of the Pareto set in complete information settings 
(domain Dz) does not extend to the case of incomplete information, at least 
for the three notions of optimality we consider. In our example showing that 
interim efficient allocations cannot always be implemented, the allocation we 
consider is also durable in the· sense of Holmstrom and lfy'erson .[1983], so it 
follows ·that durable allocations are not globally implementable either. 
Definition 7: (a) An allocation x: S-+A iS ex ante efficient if' there does not 
exist y:S-+A such that 
� qi (t)Ui (yf (t),t) � � qi (t)Ui (xi (t),t) for all i with strict inequality 
tES tES 
for at least one i. 
(b) An allocation x: S-+A is interim efficient if there does not 
exist y:S-+A such that vi (y,s) � vi (x,s) for all i and s, with strict 
inequality for at least one i and s. 
(c) An allocation x:S-+A is ex-post efficient if there does not 
exist y: S-+A such that ui (yi (s), s) � trl (xi (s), s) for all i and s, with strict 
inequality for at least one i and s. 
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Example 1: (Ex-ante efficient allocations are not globally implementable 
relative to o, ) 
Consider the following economy. There are two completely informed agents, 
one good, and two environments (states). The parameters are as follows : 
w-(5,5), u1(x,s) - s·log(x), s-1,2, u2(x,s) - log(x), q1-q2-(.5, .5). Let F be 
the social choice set consisting of all ex-ante efficient allocations. We 
will show that F does not satisfy BM. The following allocation is an element 
of F, since, as pointed out in Palfrey and Srivastava [1985], it arises from 
ex-ante trading in a complete contingent claims market for a particul'ar 
profile of endowments. 
Agent 1 
Agent 2 
State 1 
5/2 
5/2 
State 2 
10/3 
5/3 
Consider a-(a1 ,a2) with ai(s)-{ l) for both i and for both s. Then, et is 
compatible with IT since both agents are completely informed, and a(s)-( 1) for 
all· t. Since utility is increasing, the inequality in part (ii) of the 
definition of BM is trivially satisfied. For example, for s-2, the inequality 
for agent 1 reads 
BM then requires that (x(l),x(l)) be an element of F. However, (x(l),x(l)) is 
not ex-ante efficient and since JM iS necessary for implementation, we 
conclude the ex-ante efficient SCC is not implementable. 
The reason why F fails to satisfy BM iS intuitive. Ex-ante allocations 
provide insurance, while the structure of the game analyzed in this paper 
J.4 
requires trades to be made after agents receive their. private information. 
Since all agents are completely informed, there is no practical possibility
for insurance. It is therefore not particularly surprising that ex-ante 
efficient ·allocations can fail to be implementable. 
example does not depend on their being only one good. 
We note that this 
Example 2: (Interim efficient allocations are not globally implementable 
relative to D1) 
There are four agents, a single good, and three equally likely states. 
Agents 1 and 2 are completely informed, and have strictly increasing 
preferences over the good in each state. Agents 3 and 4 each have the 
partition ( ( 1 J ,  ( 2, 3 J ), i.e. they cannot distinguish states 2 and 3. Their 
preferences are given by : ui (xi(s),s) - 11i(s)log(x i(s)), with /!' (1) - o.s, 
113(2) - 0. 2S, 113(3) - 0. 75, and 114(1) - 0. 5, 114.(2) = 0. 7S, fl' (3) - 0. 2S. The 
aggregate endowment in each state is 4. 
interim-efficient: 
State 1 State 2 
Agent 1 1 1 
Agent 2 1 1 
Agent 3 1 .s 
Agent 4 1 1. 5 
The following allocation is 
State 3 
1 
1 
l.S 
. 5  
Consider the following a compatible with JI : al (El (s)) - Ei (1), all i, s. In
this case, a maps all states onto state 1, so that a(s) - (1) for all s. The 
inequality condition in BM is trivially satisfied .for agents 1 and 2 since 
they have state independent preferences. The condition for agent 3 reads: 
lS 
. 5log(l) � . 5 log(y(l)) implies 
. S [. 2Slog(l)]+. S [ . 75log(l)] � . 5[. 25log(y(l))]+. 5[. 75log(y(l))]. 
Both inequalities reduce to the same expression, so the hypotheses of BM are 
satisfied for agent 3. Since the interim preferences of agent 4 are also 
state independent, the inequality condition also holds for agent 4. BM then 
requires that the state 1 allocation in each state, which is the initial 
endowment in each state, say w, be interim efficient. However, it is clear 
that x interim dominates w, and this social choice set therefore does not 
satisfy BM. Thus' the interim-efficient sec is not globally implementable 
even if the domain is restricted to N>I information structures and state 
independent endowments. 
Example 3 : (Ex-post efficient allocations are not globally implementable 
relative to D1 ) 
There are three possible states, two goods, and four agents, with �-(6,6). 
Agents 1 and 2 are completely informed, while JI3-rr4-[[l,2) ,{ 3) ) .  Thus, agents 
3 and 4 can only distinguish state 3. The priors of agent 3 are given by 
Preferences of all agents are 
Cobb-Douglas, given by Ui (x,s)-111 (s)log(x1)+(l-l1i (s))log(x2). The /1 
parameters are: 
State 1 State 2 State 3 
Agent 1 . 25 . 2S . 2S 
Agent 2 .30 .30 .30 
Agent 3 . 2S . 7S .so 
Agent 4 . 75 . 25 .so 
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The following allocation is ex-post efficient, being the state-by-state 
Walrasian allocations when wl -w2-(2, 2), w3=w4-(l, 1) 
Agent 1 
Agent 2 
Agent 3 
Agent 4 
State 1 
(1. 43,2. 31) 
(1. 71, 2. 15) 
(0. 71,1. 15) 
(2. 14,0. 39) 
State 2 
(1.43' 2. 31) 
(1. 71,2.15) 
(2.15,0. 39) 
(0. 71,1. 15) 
State 3 
(1. 43' 2. 31) 
(1.71, 2.15) 
(1. 43' 0. 77) 
(1. 43,0. 77) 
Since agents 1 and 2 are completely informed and have state independent 
preferences, the inequality in condition (ii) of BM is satisfied for them for 
any allocation and for any admissible a. Therefore, we need to check the 
inequality condition only for agents 3 and 4. Consider, then, the following: 
a 1 ( ( s) ) - ( 3 ) , all s , a2 ( ( s ) ) - ( 3) , all s , aj ( ( l , 2) ) - ( 3 ) , a3 ( ( 3) ) - ( 3 ) . 
this a is compatible with II, and for all s, a(s)-3. We now show that 
condition (ii) of BM is satisfied for agent 3. A similar argument shows that 
it holds for agent 4. If s-1 or s-2, the inequality condition for agent 3 is: 
. 5log(l.43) + . 5log(.77) � . 5log(y ) + . 5log(y ) 
implies 
. 5[. 25log(l. 43)+. 75log(. 77)] + . 5[.75log(l. 43)+. 25log(. 77)] � 
. 5[. 2Slog(y1)+ . 75log(y2)J+. S[. 75log(y1)+. 25log(y2)] 
This holds for all (y1 ,y2) since both inequalities reduce to the same 
expression. The same argument applies to agent 4. BM then requires that the 
state 3 allocations be ex-post efficient in both states 1 and 2. However, 
x(l) ex-post dominates x(3) in state 1. Thus, ex-post efficient allocations· 
are not implementable in D1 . 
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Collectively, these examples show that in general, it is impossible to 
design a mechanism all of whose equilibria are efficient. This suggests that 
it may be inappropriate. to presume that the agents c?mmit to a specific 
mechanism prior to the occurrence of the state, since there can 'be collective 
gains to renegotiating the mechanism once everyone observes their private 
information. This is related to the problem of durability and endogenous 
mechanism choice, the implications of "*iich for full implementation are 
unknown. The problem illustrated by these examples may be solvable if agents 
are not committed to a specific mechanism prior to the realization of the 
state, since the process of choosing a mechanism can lead to transmission of 
information across agents. A detailed discussion of problems arising due to 
information leakage in endogenous mechanism choice problems is given in 
Crawford [1985]. 
Finally, we note that consistent with the three notions of optimality, we 
can define three notions of the core. The examples above also show that core 
allocations, variously d�fined, are not generally implementable. This again 
contrasts with the case of complete information. 
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IV. Market Equilibria 
In this. Section, we examine whether market determined outcomes yield SCC's 
which are globally implementable relative to D1 . As stated before, in the 
case of complete information, it is well known that the (constrained) 
Walrasian correspondence is globally implementable (relative to °'1 ) . With 
incomplete information, the most frequently studied notion of market 
equilibrium is that of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE), and we turn 
next to the question: relative to which domains is the REE sec globally 
imple�entable? 
An REE is defined as follows. Given a price function p: S -+ R L, let 
El (p,s)- { t E Ei (s) I p(t)-p(s) ) . This event represents the information of 
i at s given prices p. Notice that if prices are fully revealing, then 
Ei (p,s) - {s) . · At s, individual i cbooses zi ERL to maximize 
. 
�91 (t l Ei (p,s))Ui (zi ,t) subject to p(s) · [zi - wi (s)] :SO. 
teE1 (p,s) 
Let xi (s) denote the demand correspondence of i at s. An R EE is a price 
function p such that Mien agents solve the above problem, markets clear. Let 
(x,p) denote an REE. Consider the REE social choice set 
F - { x: S-+A I 3 p: S-+RL such that (x, p) is an REE ) . Our main result about 
REE's is the following: 
Theorem 2: Let D 1 be a subset of economies in D1 such that for all d E D 1 for 
all i E I, s E S 
{ z e R� I ul (z,s) � 6 J c R� for all 6 > O. 
The REE  SCC is globally implementable relative to D1. 
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Proof: Let x E F, and let p be the associated price. The hypotheses of the 
theorem ensure that p(s) � 0 for all s and that x1 (s) � 0 for all i ands. 
Let a be compatible with II, and suppose that the PM inequality condition 
is satisfied. Suppose that x,. is not an REE. Given some s E S, let s' -
a(s), and recall that Ei (p, s') {t' E Ei(s') l p(t') - p(s')) . Note that 
strict concavity of the utility function implies that x i(t') - x i(s') for all 
t' E Ei (p,s'), and so prices and demands are constant across El (p,s'). 
Define Ei (p,s) { t E El (s) I p(a(t)) = p(s') ) . 
Note (1) if t E Ei(p,s), then a(t) E E1(p,s'), and 
(2) if t E Ei (s), t 11.El (p,s), then a(t) 1$. Ei (p,s'). 
Since x,. is not an R EE, then there exists a state s, an 
allocation zl such that p(a(s))· [zl - w1] :S 0, and 
( 3) �. q 1 ( t IE 1 ( p , s) ) ui ( z 1 , t) > �. q 1 ( t IE 1 ( p ; s) ) ui ( x� ( s) , t) 
teE' (p,s) teE1 (p,s) 
agent i, and an 
Our strong interiority assumptions allow zl to be chosen such that O � zi � w. 
Let s' - a(s). 
Since xi (t') - xi (s') for all t' E Ei (p,s'), (1) implies that x�(t) 
for all t E Ei (p,s). Thus, (3) can be written as
(4) �_qi(tjEi(p,s))Ui(zi ,t) > �_qi(tjEi(p,s))Ui(x�(t),t). 
teE1 (p,s) teE1 (p,s) 
Define yi as follows 
{ z
.
i if t' E Ei (p,s') 
yi (t') -
x1 (t') otherwise. 
Points (1) and (2) above imply that for all t e E l (p,s), :y�(t) = zi , and for 
all t E E1 (s), t 11. E1 (p,s), y�(t) = x�(t). Inequality (4) implies that 
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Vi (ya,S) >Vi (Xa,s). 
Let yl (t') - [w - yi (t')]/ [I-1] for all j � i. Then, since all the xi (t') and 
zi are strictly positive and strictly less than w, y is feasible, i. e. y(t') E 
A for all t'. The inequality condition of BM then implies that vi (y, s') > 
Vi (x,s'). From (2) above, 
� qi(t' I Ei(p,s'))Ui(yi(t'),t') > � qi(t' I E;(p,s'))Ui(xi(t'),t'). 
t'EEi (p,s') t'EEi (p,s') 
Note that by construction, prices are non-revealing over the event E1 (p, s'), 
and that xi(t') .- x i(s') for all t' e E i(p,s'). Finally, rote that zi is 
feasible at Ei (p, s'), mich contradicts the assumption that x i(s') is utility 
maximizing at Ei (p, s'). Therefore, the rational expectations equilibrium 
social choice set satisfies BM. Olr assumptions guarantee that all 
allocations are interior to the feasible set, so that Theorem 1 applies to 
show that the REE SCC is globally implementable relative to 01. • 
The next example shows that the curvature assumption on indifference 
curves cannot be dispensed with-. The assumption rules out equilibria on the 
boundary of the feasible set, which can lead to pathologies of the sort 
discussed in Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite [1984]. 
Example 4: The economy consists of 3 agents, 3 goods and 3 equally likely 
states. Endowments are given by: w1 (s) - (0, 0, 10) for all s, w2 (s) - (1, 0, 0)
for all s, and w3(s) - (0,1,0) for all s. The utility functions of the agents 
are given by: 
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State 1 State 2 State 3 
Agent 1 
Agent 2 
Agent 3 
Agents 2 and 3 are completely informed, while the information of agent 1 is 
rr1 - { { 1) , { 2, 3) ) . The following prices and allocations form the unique REE for 
this example : 
Prices 
Agent 1 
Agent 2 
Agent 3 
State 1 
(.5, . 5,1) 
(1,1,9) 
(0,0, .5) 
(0,0, . 5) 
State 2 
(.2,1,1) 
(l,l,8. 8) 
(0,0, . 2) 
(0,0,1) 
State 3 
(1,.2,1) 
(l,l,8. 8) 
(0,0,l) 
(0,0, . 2) 
To show that this sec is not implementable, consider ai such that ai (Ei (s)) 
Ei (1) for all s. This a is clearly compatible with II. To see that the BM 
inequality is satisfied, note that it is trivially satisfied for agents 2 and 
3. For agent 1, it reduces to showing that: 
20 :2: y1 + y2 + 2y3 implies 10.2 :2: ".6y1 + . 6y2 + y3 
It is straightforward to verify that this condition is satisfied for all 
feasible y. BM then requires that the state 1 allocation be an REE in both 
states 2 and 3. Since the REE is unique and the allocations are different 
across the states, it follows that BM is violated. 
Next, we show that the assumption of state independent individual 
endowments cannot, in general, be relaxed. 
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Example 5: There are three possible environments (states), two goods, and 
three agents. Agents 1 and 2 are completely informed, while n3- { { l,2), { 3)). 
Thus, agent 3 can only distinguish state 3. Agent 3' s priors are such that 
Preferences of all agents are Cobb-Douglas, 
given by ui (x,s)-pl (s)log(x1)+(1-pi (s))log(x2). Initial endowments and the p 
parameters are: 
State 1 State 2 State 3 
w p w p w p 
Agent 1 (l,3) . 25 (3,1) . 25 (2,2) . 25 
Agent 2 (3,l) . 30 (1,3) . 30 (2,2) . 30 
Agent 3 (1,1) . 25 (1,1) .75 (1,1) .so 
Th·e unique REE in this example has. fully revealing prices, so that the 
equilibrium allocations are simply the state-by-state Walrasian allocations. 
We note that with complete information, this SCC is implementable. The 
equilibrium prices and allocations are given by: 
State 1 State 2 State 3 
Prices (. 36' 1) (. 60,1) (. 47' 1) 
Agent 1 (2. 33,2. 52) ( 1. 17' 2. 09) (1.56,2.21) 
Agent 2 (1. 73,1.46) (1.82,2. 51) (1.88,2. 05) 
Agent 3 (0. 94,1. 02) (2.01,0. 40) (1. 56,0. 73) 
Since agents 1 and 2 are completely informed and have state independent 
preferences, the inequality in condition (ii) of BM is satisfied for them for 
any allocation and for any admissible a. Consider the compatible a given by 
ai (Ei (s)) - Ei (3) for all i and s, so that for all s, a(s)-3. For agent 3, 
condition (ii) of BM is satisfied trivially. If s-1 or s-2, the inequality 
condition is: 
. 5log(l. 56) + . 5log(. 73) � . Slog(y1) + . Slog(y2) 
implies 
. S [. 25log(l. 56)+. 75log(. 73)) + . S[. 75log(l. 56)+. 25log(. 73)) � 
. 5 [. 25log(y1)+. 75log(y2)]+. 5[. 7Slog(y1)+. 25log(y2)) 
This holds for all (y1 ,y2 ) since both inequalities reduce to the same 
expression. BM then requires that the state 3 allocations be REE' s in both 
states 1 and 2. Because the REE allocations are unique and different in each 
state, BM is violated, and the REE sec is therefore not implementable. 
Finally, we rnte that in the absence of NEI or some other strong 
informational condition, REE allocations generally violate self-selection 
conditions which are necessary for implementation. Consequently, they are 
not, in general, implementable (Blume and Easley [1985)). 
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V. Fair Allocations 
In this Section, we show that non-zero envy-free allocations are globally 
implementable, where the concept of no-envy used is a straightforward 
extension of that used in the case of complete information. 
Definition 8: An allocation x:s�A is (interim) envy-free if for all i,j,s, 
� 9i(t , Ef(s))Ui(xf(t),t) � � 9f(t , Ei(s))Ui(xl(t),t). 
tEE1 (s) tEE1 (s) 
This states that at any state of information, no agent prefers the allocation 
of any other agent to his own. Thus, this is an interim version of the 
familiar no-envy condition. 
Theorem 3: Non-zero envy-free allocations are globally implementable in o1. 
froof: Let x be an envy-free fair allocation. Suppose a is compatible with IT, 
and that all the hypotheses· of the BM condition are satisfied. ·suppose that 
Xa is not envy-free. Then, there exists s,i,j such that 
� qi(tlEi(s))Ui(x�(t),t) > � qi(tlEi(s))Ui(x�(t),t). 
tEEf (s) tEEi (s) 
Consider the allocation y where, for all t E S, 
{ xk(t) if k � i,j 
yk(t) - xl (t) if k - i 
xi (t) if k - j 
Then, y is clearly feasible, and by construction, 
� qi (tlEi (s) )Ui (y�(t), t) > � qi (ti El )s))Uf (�(t), t). 
tEEi (s) tEEf (s) 
The BM inequality then implies that 
� qi(t' I Ei(s'))Ui(yi(t'),t') > � qf(t' I Ei(s'))Ui(xf(t'),t'), which 
t'EEI (s') t'EEf (s') 
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contradicts x being envy-free. 
Interim fair allocations, >ktich can be defined as allocations >ktich are 
both interim efficient and interim envy-free, are not globally implementable 
in n1. The reason for this stems from the failure of interim efficient 
allocations to be globally implementable in o1 • 
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VI. Public Good Economies 
In this Section we consider economies in which there are two goods, a 
private good, x, and a public good, e. The analysis is easily extended to 
economies with many private and many public goods, as long as the public goods 
are produced using a linear technology. Each individual in the economy is 
endowed with wi > 0 units of the private good in each state. Production of 
each unit of the public good requires one unit of the private good. Thus the 
aggregate feasibility condition on allocations in the public good economy is 
I 
Hence 
� Zf + I - w i-1 
A - ((z,n E R+
l+l I r - � (wi - zi)J
i-1 
The set of feasible state contingent allocations is 
x - ((x,e) : s � AJ
We will denote the private good allocation at s by x(s) and the public good 
allocation at s by e<s). 
As before, the specification of an economy also includes its set of 
individuals, I, economic environments, S, the profile of individual partitions 
of S, II, and the profile of individual (strictly positive) priors over the
states, q. 
With complete information and public goods a natural market equilibrium 
concept is Lindahl equilibrium. In fact, paralleling the results for private 
good economies, the Lindahl equilibrium is (fully ) implementable via Nash 
equilibrium with complete information. �ith incomplete information the 
appropriate definition of public good equilibrium is not clear. However, in 
keeping with the parallel to Walrasian equilibrium, we consider Rational 
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Expectations Lindahl Equilibrium (RE�E) defined below. It is both the natural 
extension of REE to public good ·environments and the natural extension of 
Lindahl equilibrium to incomplete information economies. While the 
interpretation in terms of a market-type. mechanism is quite awkward, these 
equilibria do inherit the global implementability properties of REE and 
(complete information) Lindahl equilibria. Whether these allocations (or REE 
allocations for that natter) can be implemented by a market-type mechanism is 
an open question. 
Let ( px(s), p� (s), . . .  ,pe (s) ) be a private good price function and an 
I-tuple of individual (Lindahl) public good price functions. For any price 
function, p(·), let 
For any a compatible with II and any s ES, s' - a(s), let 
Ei (pi ,s') - (t' E Ei (s') I pf (t') - pi (s')l 
Ei (pi ,s) - (t E El (s) I pi (a(t)) pi (s')) 
Notice that prices may be fully revealing for some individuals and not fully 
revealing to other individuals, since Lindahl prices will typically be 
different ·across individuals. At s, individual i chooses (zi ,0 E R2 to 
maximize 
subject to 
� 91 <� IEf (pf ,s)uf (zi ,I ,t) 
teE1 (p1 , s) 
Px (s)(wi -zl) � Pe (s) 
Markets must clear and price·s must be consistent with profit maximization. 
A condition for the latter is 
I . 
px (s) - � p
1 (s) for all s 
i-1 
Definition 9: A Rational Expectations Lindahl Equilibriwn (RELE) is a state 
contingent allocation (x*, e*) E X and a collection of price functions p �( · ) , 
Pt(·), · . .  ,pt1 (-) such that: 
(1) For all i,s 
x*i (s), e*(s) maximizes �qi (t lEI (pi ,s))Ui (zi ,e,t)
teEi (pi ,s) 
subject to Px(s)zi + p� (s)e � Px(s)wi 
I . * (2) e* (s) - � [w1-x I (s)J for all s 
I . i-1 
(3) � p� (s) - Px(s) for all s 1-1 � 
The domain of economies we consider here is a simple adaptation of D 1 ·to 
allow for public goods. Specifically it is the i;et of all linear economies 
with one private
. 
and one public good in which aggregate and individual 
endowments are state 'independent, utility functions are continuous, strictly 
increasing and strictly concave, S is finite and NE! holds. Call this domain 
The following theorem establishes that with the additional domain 
restriction to insure that Lindahl allocations will be strictly interior to 
conswnption sets (indifference curves asymptote to the axes), the RELE sec is 
globally implementable. 
Theorem 4: Let D3 be the set of economies in o3 such that 
((zi,n e � I ui(zi,\,s) � SJ c �
for all c5>0 
Then the RELE SCC is globally implementable relative to o3. 
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Proof: Suppose (x*,e*) is an RELE. Let a be compatible with II. Suppose 
Then there exists s,i, (zi ,\) such that, denoting 
s'-a(s), 
� qi (t lEi (pl ,s) [Ui (zi ,\, t) - ui (x*i (s') ,e*(s'), t) J > 0 
teEi (pi ,s)
and Px(s')zi + p� (s')I � Px(s')wi. 
By strict concavity of U, (zi ,I) can be made arbitrarily close to (x*i ,e*) so
that 0 � zi + I � w. Hence there exists a (z-i ,\) such that (z,\) is feasible.
Let 
{ (z,\) if t' e Ei (pi ,s')
y(t') -
(x*(t'),e*(t')) if t' fie Ei (pi ,s') 
The proof continues a!! in Theorem 2 to establish that the RELE social choice 
set is monotonic. The asswnption on preferences ensures that all RELE 
allocations are in the interior of the feasible set. This condition also 
guarantees that private goods are valued enough, so that the proof of Theorem 
1 can be easily extended to cover any economy in this domain. Therefore, the 
RELE SCC is globally implementable on this domain. 
It is straightforward to construct examples to show that this result does 
not hold if w I is state dependent or if (x*, e*) is on the boundary of some 
individual's conswnption set. Counterexamples to implementability of
efficient allocat'ions (ex ante, interim, or ex post) with public goods are 
also easily constructed. 
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